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COMPETITION CATALYSTS
TIM WU*

INTRODUCTION................................................33

I.

BACKGROUND.............................................36

A.
B.
1.

History......................................36
A Closer Look at the 1970s-90s............
1. Lessons...................................46
THEORY & TAXONOMY.
..............................

A.

........... 39
....... 47

Separation Rules (Quarantinesor Tie-breakers)..... ...... 49
1. Successful and Failed Separation Rules
............ 49
2. The Importance of Clean Cuts...................

52

B.

Deregulation:Pro-competitive Removal of Regulatory Barriers.. 54

C.
D.
E.

Switching Cost Reducers
................................. 56
Leveling the Playing Field / Common CarrierRegulation........... 58
Truth-in-PricingRules (Quran)...................... ...... 59

POTENTIAL
1.
AND PERILS
CONCLUSION.

61
.................... 62

e.....................................

........................

......

INTRODUCTION

In its March 26, 2016 issue, The Economist magazine announced
that "America needs a giant dose of competition."r Its study of

industry concentration and profits suggested that, after decades of
consolidation, competition had decreased across a broad range of the
* Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor at Columbia Law School. The author
was previously an advisor to the National Economic Council in the Executive Office of
the President, during which period some of these ideas were formulated, but the views
expressed are not to be attributed anyone other than the author. I thank the Columbia
law faculty for feedback, as well as Charlie Anderson, David Edelman, Howard Shelanski and Tom Merrill.
1. THE EcONosT, Too Much of a Good Thing, EcONOMIS (Mar. 26, 2016),
http://www.econonist.com/newsbriefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needsgiant-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing [https://perma.cc/2RN8-SZHU].
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American economy. 2 An April 2016 issue brief by the Council of
Economic Advisors reached similar conclusions, stating that
"competition appears to be declining" due to "increasing industry
concentration, increasing rents accruing to a few firms, and lower
levels of firm entry and labor market mobility." 3
The promotion of competition in the American economy is a task
that has traditionally fallen to the enforcement agencies at the federal
and state level, relying on the main antitrust statutes.4 However, the
challenge of declining competition has also prompted interest in the
use of regulatory alternatives to antitrust to "catalyze" competition.5
The strategy involves using industry-specific statutes, rulemakings, or
other tools of the regulatory state to achieve the traditional
competition goals associated with the antitrust laws.6 Hence,
"antitrust via rulemaking."
While conducting competition policy outside of the main
antitrust laws is not entirely new, it came into some prominence
7
through an April 15,2016 Executive Order issued by the White House.
In that order, the President charged the executive agencies as follows:
Executive departments and agencies with authorities that could
be used to enhance competition (agencies) shall, where
consistent with other laws, use those authorities to promote
competition, arm consumers and workers with the information
they need to make informed choices, and eliminate regulations
that restrict competition without corresponding benefits to the
American public.8
In the field of administrative law, there is a longstanding debate
over the relative merits of rulemaking and adjudication. 9 Beginning in
the 1960s there was a decisive shift among most agencies toward

2. Id. ("One way American firms have improved their moats in recent times is through
creeping consolidation .... The weighted average share of the top four firms in each sector
has risen from 26% to 32%.").
3. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF

MARKET POWER 4 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/
files/20160414_cea-competition issuebrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM8H-FV5B].
4. Id. at 8.
5. See id. at 11-12.
6. Id.
7. Exec. Order No. 13,725, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,417 (Apr. 15, 2016).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., William T. Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the Rulemaking Versus
Adjudication Problem in Agency Lawmaking, 1980 DUKE L.J. 103, 103-04; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 529, 529-30
(2005).
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rulemaking.10 However, with exceptions (most of which are described
here), the promotion of competition-the antitrust regime-remains
rooted in an adjudication model, and might even be described as stuck
there. More effective and widespread promotion of competition may
require more widespread and effective use of pro-competitive
rulemaking by a broader variety of agencies.
This Paper has two goals. The first goal is to better describe the
regulatory tools used by agencies and government-the so-called
"competitive catalysts." This Paper attempts to develop both a
vocabulary and basic theoretical account that helps to explain how
rulemaking can promote competition. It does so by providing a
taxonomy of major tools used to catalyze competition. Among the
tools are:
- Separationor QuarantineRules: Aimed at breaking longstanding
ties or bundles;
- Pro-competitive Deregulation: The elimination or softening of
regulatory barriers to entry or costs of competition;
- Switching Cost Reducers: Rules designed to reduce the costs of
switching between competitors;
- Levelers: Rules designed to help equalize the conditions of
competition in some way, such as common-carriage rules; and
- Price Transparency regimes: Rules meant to prevent firms from
hiding elevated prices.
This descriptive work is important because this is an area where
the vocabulary now used is particularly confusing." For instance, the
word "deregulation" has been used both to describe the removal of
regulations, and also the enactment of new regulations intended to

10. See Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise:Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the
1960s and 1970s, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1139, 1147 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REv. 467, 54649 (2002).
11. Much of the confusion arises from the association between government action and
the restriction of competition. It is true that laws and regulations do sometimes deliberately
impede competition-as in the awarding of patent rights or of exclusive franchises. But they
can also promote competition-consider the Sherman Act and Clayton Acts, or some of the
schemes considered below, like the Hatch-Waxman Act's promotion of the market entry of

generic drugs. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012) (effective July 2, 1890); see
also Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2012) (effective Oct. 15, 1914); Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,98 Stat. 1585 (1984) [hereinafter
Hatch-Waxman Act]. And some laws do neither, like public safety or consumer protection
rules. The latter may impose costs on businesses, but that's very different than saying that
such costs affect competition.
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promote competition. 12 Phrases like "light-touch" regulation are
equally vague, and are often better described as pro-competitive
regulation.
A second goal of the Paper is the admittedly difficult goal of
trying to understand why some competition initiatives have worked,
while others fail. As these are highly complex industries and
regulatory initiatives, any such analysis cannot be definitive.
Nonetheless, a study of the efforts to jump-start competition yields
patterns from which best-practices might be derived, and from which
any future regulator should learn. 1 3 This Paper concludes with a list of
best-practices or rules-of-thumb for those who would hope to use laws
to catalyze competition in the future.
This Paper proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background
and context. Part II discusses some of the economic theory behind procompetitive regulation and provides a taxonomy and description of
the major categories of pro-competitive regulation. Part III discusses
both the potential, but also the limitations and possible perils of
regulatory competition policy.
I.

BACKGROUND

This Section describes the traditional divide between the
"regular" and regulated industries, and the later 20th century
movement to introduce competition into the regulated industries. It
then describes several major statutory schemes that can be considered
ancestors of today's pro-competitive regulatory efforts. Finally, it
discusses more recent pro-competitive efforts, particularly as found in
the second term of the Obama administration.
A.

History

The contemporary interest in competition catalysts can be
understood as an evolution of the nation's approach towards
regulated industries and as such, an evolution of the deregulation
movement that began in the late 1970s and 1980s. In context, what this
Paper describes is a broadening of some of the regulatory techniques

12. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325 (1998).
13. Another effort in this vein is SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN REGULATING AND
DEREGULATING UTILITIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE UK, EUROPE, AND THE USA (Colin Robinson

ed., 2004).
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discussed by Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill in 1998 to reach a
larger set of industries, and using a wider set of tools. 14

For most of the 20th century, the antitrust paradigm and the
public-utility paradigm were the mainstays of economic regulation in
the United States. 15 (A third approach, nationalization, was never
particularly popular in the United States, despite a few experiments,
like the brief nationalization of AT&T). 16 The antitrust paradigm
presupposed markets that were capable of competition, but were also
vulnerable to cartelization or monopolization.1 7 Antitrust enforcement
pursued by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) was prosecutorial, case driven, and inescapably motivated by
some concept of wrongful conduct causing harm. It existed in contrast
to the public-utility paradigm, which in its original form presupposed
an industry that could not reasonably be left entirely to its own
devices, for one reason or another.18 The origins of public utilities lay
in the common law concept that some businesses were "public
callings," or, in the phrase used by Lord Hale, "affected with a publick
interest." 19 As the Supreme Court put it:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used
in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the
community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property
to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants
to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of
the interest he has thus created. 20
There was more than one public consideration for which an
industry might find itself in a category of a public calling, utility, or
regulated industry. Examples included the potential for price gouging
and a desire for consistent service (energy, electricity, and the
14. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 12.
15. See id. at 1329-30.
16. See
RICHARD
R.
JOHN,
NETWORK
NATION:
INVENTING
AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 400-05 (2010).
17. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND
ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 1-5 (6th ed. 2014) ("Antitrust law is the study of competition. It
is a body of law that seeks to assure competitive markets through the interaction of sellers

and buyers in the dynamic process of exchange.... [T]he promotion of competition through
restraints on monopoly and cartel behavior clearly emerges as the first principle of
antitrust.").

18. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 12, at 1325.
19. LORD HALE, De PortibusMaris, in A TREATISE IN THREE PARTS (1675), reprinted in 1 A
COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 45, 77-78 (Francis Hargrave ed.,

1787).
20. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
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telephone system), public safety (medicines, nuclear power), publicservice goals (broadcasting), or systemic economic risk (banking and
insurance). By the New Deal most of these industries would be
governed by a federal commission, and sometimes state commissions
as well, forming, as a whole, what came to be called the "regulated
industries." 21 The new agencies and their rules typically sought to
control entry and exit, regulate prices, or to directly regulate how the
industry conducted its business to ensure public safety, financial
stability or other public goals. 22
In practice, most of the traditionally regulated industries were
those providers of services thought essential to the economy, or in
some other way raised public concerns, such as energy, transportation,
telecommunications, banking and credit, medical services, alcohol,
and insurance. 23 The laws did not uniformly follow the same model.
Some of the regulatory regimes had explicitly pro-competitive goals
that went beyond the Sherman Act-such as the Alcohol
Administration Act,2 4 which has explicit competition mandates built
into it. 25

From the 1970s through the 1990s, the basic regulatory industry
paradigm changed dramatically in several ways. First, a so-called
deregulatory movement generally sought reductions or eliminations
of regulations from the New Deal and placed more faith in
competition. 26 The full history of the deregulation movement is
lengthy and complex, 2 7 but the principal criticism, made by Fred Kahn
among others, was that competition was indeed possible in industries
where it was thought hopeless, that natural monopoly had become a

21. The history is briefly summarized in ROBERT B. HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF
REGULATORY REFORM: THE DEREGULATION OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 65-76
(1989). See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE

REGULATORY STATE 17-21 (1990) (detailing the evolution of the regulatory state, from the
writing of the Constitution to New Deal Constructionism).

22. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 19-24.
23. See HORWITZ, supra note 21, at 71.
24. Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (2012) (prohibiting, for
example, vertical arrangements in which retailers must exclusively deal with certain
wholesalers of alcoholic beverages).
25. Id. § 205(a).
26. RICHARD H. K. VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION

IN AMERICA 330 (1994) ("What had changed most was the New Deal's fundamental premise,
namely that competition was the problem. Now government itself was viewed as the
problem-at best, a necessary evil.").
27. See generally REGULATORY ISSUES SINCE 1964: THE RISE OF THE DEREGULATION

MOVEMENT (Robert F. Himmelberg ed., 1994) (providing insight into deregulation from
several perspectives); MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL

J. QUIRK, THE

POLITICS OF DEREGULATION

(1985) (detailing the historical background surrounding deregulation and explaining the
political debate for deregulation reform); VIETOR, supra note 26 (addressing specific case
studies relating to economic regulation).
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self-fulfilling prophecy, and the industry might be at least partially
deregulated without compromising public goals.2 8 This led, in main
part, to laws or rulemakings abolishing controls on market entry and
pricing, especially in the telecommunications, airline, trucking, and
rail industries. 29
Second, while sometimes confusingly described as deregulation,
some agencies also began using regulation to promote competition.
This was a development with its origins at the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
which sought, for example, to promote new technologies like
VHF/UHF broadcasting and cable television as competitors to
mainstream broadcasting, and sought to allow competition with the
AT&T monopoly in long-distance services and handsets. 30 By the
1990s, as Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill would observe, in at
least some agencies, "[t]he role of the agency has been transformed
from one of protecting end users to one of arbitrating disputes among
rival providers and, in particular, overseeing access to and pricing of
'bottleneck' facilities that could be exploited by incumbent firms to
stifle competition." 3 1
B.

A Closer Look at the 1970s-90s

A full canvasing of the efforts to catalyze competition would be
beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, we can usefully learn
from five well-known late-20th century statutes and one rulemaking
as important landmarks in the first wave of pro-competitive laws: the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the FTC's 1978 Eyeglass Rule, the
Hatch-Waxman Act (enacted in 1986), and two FCC efforts: the
Carterfone regime and the 1996 Telecom Act. Without claiming that
these laws were necessarily the most economically significant, they
each came to industries with known competition problems and used
rules to try to improve the conditions of competition therein. 32
28. See ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1971).
See also RICHARD A. POSNER, NATURAL MONOPOLY AND ITS REGULATION (1999) (discussing
whether the concept of natural monopoly can justify the imposition of regulatory controls).
29. See KAHN, supra note 28; see also POSNER, supranote 28.
30. See HORWITZ, supra note 21, at 221-63.

31. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 12, at 1326.
32. There is, of course, an enormous amount of scholarship that has considered each of
these statutes in depth and from various angles. The goal here is not to make any
contribution to the debates surrounding these statutes, but to gain an understanding of the
specific techniques used by each. See, e.g., STEVEN MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1986) (analyzing the effects of airline
deregulation on both travelers and the airline industry); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How
INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE

40
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First, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was an important effort
to remove regulatory barriers to entry. 33 This act was the brainchild of
economist and bureaucrat Alfred Kahn, and an early project of thenCongressional staffer Stephen Breyer. 34 It is a complex statute; as
relevant here, its most important aspect was the removal of constraints
of entry and exit imposed by the Civil Aeronautics Board (which was
itself eliminated). 35 The immediate impact of the law was to allow the
market entrance of a series of low-cost airlines, like Southwest Airlines,
People Express Airlines, and others, to challenge the existing carriers
with lower priced flights. 36 In the short term, the statute succeeded in
its self-defined goal of increasing competition and saving consumers
money. 37 The longer-term assessment has been more mixed,
particularly after the major airlines consolidated into a small number
of firms and displayed signs of oppressive oligopoly practices, such as
coordinated pricing and degraded customer service. 38
Second, the Hatch-Waxman Act (formally, the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act), was an effort to trim
some of the inherently anti-competitive aspects of FDA drug
regulation and the U.S. patent system. 39 It sought to allow generic
drugs to reach the market as quickly as possible after the expiration of
a patent, as opposed to being further delayed by many years of
regulatory proceedings. 40 It also tinkered with the patent system,
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1998), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress1997-1998/reports/pharm.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LL4-FTTP] (examining the extent to which
competition from generic drugs has increased since the Hatch-Waxman Act); ROBERT W.
CRANDALL, COMPETITION AND CHAOS: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SINCE THE 1996 TELECOM

ACT (2005) (arguing that the 1996 Telecommunications Act inappropriately invited state and
federal regulators to micromanage

competitive entry into local telecommunications

markets).
33. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
34. Christopher DeMuth et al., Foreword to STEPHEN BREYER, ECONOMIC REASONING
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW, at vii (2004).

35. See Airline Deregulation Act of Oct. 24, 1978.
36. Summer Airline Fare Skirmishes Begin, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 1981),
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/15/business/summer-airline-fare-skirmishes-begin.html
[https://perma.cc/XFC6-BVZ5]; Daniel F. Cuff, How To Start An Airline: People Express Poised
To Fly, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/26/business/how-tostart-an-airline-people-express-poised-to-fly.html? [https://perma.cc/PU9N-WHN3].
37. Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, Airline Deregulation and Public Policy, 245
SCIENCE 707, 708 (1989) (finding that increased competition stemming from deregulation had
provided travelers and carriers with $14.9 billion of annual benefits).
38. See A Lack of Competition Explains the Flaws in American Aviation, ECONOMIST (Apr.
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21721201-americans-are-treated2017),
22,
[https://perma.cc/3RCEabysmally-their-airlines-they-should-look-europe-lessons-lack
CFA8]; Tim Wu, Why I Left United Airlines, NEW YORKER (Nov. 14, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/leaving-united-airlines-after-merger

[https://perma.cc/YAK3-LH3F].
39. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
40. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug
Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 189-91 (1999).
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giving patent owners some benefits, like a partial extension of the
patent period to account for the time spent in the regulatory approval
process, while also creating incentives for generic drug companies to
invalidate bad patents.4 1
The Hatch-Waxman is notable as an effort to diminish the anticompetitive effects of pervasive regulation, as opposed to effecting a
complete or partial deregulation. It's rollout was, predictably, the
subject of some short-term problems, and the implementation has
perhaps not been a complete success -especially given the propensity
of the generic and brand-name drug companies to collude to try and
avoid its pro-competitive impact. 42 As Scott Hemphill points out,
aspects of the statute's design made collusion attractive, by offering a
clear bounty to the colluders, serving as a reminder that even
regulatory efforts to catalyze competition can have unexpected
consequences.43

Nonetheless, by 1994, the Congressional Budget Office was
estimating billions in consumer savings, while investment in new
drugs continued to rise. 44 Since the passage of Hatch-Waxman, the
generic pharmaceutical association estimates that generic drugs have
grown to become 88% of the prescribed drugs in the United States. 45
The association found that $254 billion in savings in 2014 can be
attributed to generic pharmaceuticals, some amount of which must be
attributed to the legislation.46
Third, the FCC's Carterfonerule is a classic, and arguably the most
successful example of what we later call a "separation" rule. AT&T, in
the 1960s, enjoyed a super-monopoly that encompassed multiple,
adjoining markets, including local telephony, long-distance, handsets,
and various associated services. 47 The services were "tied" -one could
not buy local service without also getting an AT&T telephone.48
Seeking to promote competition in the sale of handsets, the FCC
required that AT&T create a standardized wall-jack into which any

41. Id.

42. C. Scott Hemphill, Payingfor Delay: PharmaceuticalPatent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV., 1553, 1562-77 (2006).
43. Id. at 1578-95.
44. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 32, at ix.

45. Generic Drug Savings in the U.S.

Seventh Annual Edition: 2015, GENERIC

PHARMACEUTICAL ASS'N (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.gphaonline.org/media/wysiwyg/
PDF/GPhASavingsReport_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/LEE9-MY72].

46. Id.
47. THE MASTER SWITCH, infra note 57, at 304-05.
48. JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 62-63 (2005).
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telephone could be plugged, regardless of whether it was produced by
the Bell system. 49
The Bell system, which has a storied history of resistance to procompetitive laws, fought the standard phone jack.5 0 Most scholars
agree however, that the standardized jack-a separation rule-was
one of the most successful competition catalysts.51 Over time, it not
only yielded more competition in telephone handsets, but led to
increased innovation in the attachment market, which had been
carefully controlled by AT&T. 52 The years after the adoption of the
standardized jack yielded technologies including the answering
machine, the fax machine, and the home modem, among other
inventions.53 Meanwhile, based on those technologies, entire new
industries grew, such as popular "dial-up" network on the model of
AOL or Compuserve, which in turn served as the backbone of the
popular Internet. In short, the standardized phone jack was, arguably,
the spark that yielded a massive and economically defining quality of
newly unplugged innovation.
The most important point that can be drawn from the success of
the Carterfonerule is that the most successful rulemakings will see their
significance not by the competition they introduce in the targeted
industry (in this case, the market for physical telephones), but by
easing barriers to market entry in related markets or even new markets
unknown at the time of regulation. In Schumpeterian terms, the best
rulemakings don't just spark competition within the industry, but
rather set the table for the birth of entirely new industries which may
even come to destroy the original target. 54 Of course, predicting that
such a thing will happen is not exactly easy, given that we live and
regulate in the present, but the potential must be kept in mind.
Fourth, the most notable failure dating from the 70s-90s was the
1996 Telecommunications Act's unbundling rules. The 1996 Act itself
was a successor to a long series of pro-competitive FCC rulemakings
and the 1984 AT&T antitrust decree.55 At the time it was billed as an
49. See id. at 138-40.
50. Id. at 58-59 (resistance coming in the form of requiring what was called a "protective
coupling" device).
51. Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT'L J. OF COMM. 389, 395-97 (2007) [hereinafter
Wireless Carterfone]. See also Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve Various OutstandingIssues
Concerning the Implementation of the Commc'ns Assistance for Law Enf't Act, RM-10865,
Comments of the Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. (Apr. 12, 2004).
52. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 48.
53. Wireless Carterfone, supra note 51.
54. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83-84 (1950).

55. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom.;
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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effort to introduce competitive forces into every part of the
telecommunications industry, "to let any communications business
compete in any market against any other."5 6 Unlike Hatch-Waxman,
the Telecommunications Act was targeted not at a regulatorybarrier to
entry, but a private barrier: the monopolized bottleneck that is the "lastmile" of copper telephone lines connecting homes and businesses to
the telephone network. The 1996 Act, in that sense, looked much like
an antitrust-remedy regime backed into a statute. That it was designed
to replace the consent decree, which had governed the Bell System
since 1984, may help explain the Act's purpose.57
The 1996 Act was exceptionally complex, but its central remedy
was understood as its effort to promote competition in local
communications services, the historic core of the AT&T monopoly. The
most dramatic remedy was its unbundling, or shared-facilities, regime
that allowed companies to lease the local Bell Company's lines at an
extremely reasonable price, so as to provide their own service over
those lines.58 In theory, the premise was that the consumer would
choose between a number of competing resellers of telephone and
perhaps broadband services, all of whom were in fact relying on the
same underlying wires.59 Despite sharing the same infrastructure,
differential competition would come in matters of price, marketing,
and additional services provided.60 The law promised a golden age of
competition in an industry that hadn't seen much of it.
Things didn't work as planned, and by the early 2000s the 1996
Act was being widely decried as a failure.6 1 By then, the new firms that
had relied on the 1996 Act to provide new services had nearly all been
destroyed by the Bells, which had also seized the opportunity to

56. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, FCC (June 20, 2013), https://www
.fcc.gov/general/telecommunications-act-1996
[https://perma.cc/X5FK-KAF4].
For the
statute in full, see Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, and 47 U.S.C.).
57. TIM Wu, THE MASTER SwITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 244

(2010) [hereinafter THE MASTER SWITCH].
58. Telecommunications Act of 1996

§ 251.

59. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

20-26 (1999) (describing the regulatory design of unbundling and other remedies).
60. Id.
61. See generally Lawrence Gasman, Why The Telecommunications Act is Failing, CATO
INST. (Jan. 6, 1997), https://www.cato.org/pubhcations/commentary/why-telecomm
unications-act-is-failing [https://perma.cc/ZN4K-7B42] (arguing that Congress should revisit
the 1996 Act); Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act: Deregulation Before Meaningful
Competition

Spells

Consumer

Disaster,

CONSUMERS

UNION

(Feb.

2000),

http://

consumersunion.org/pdf/lesson.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8QY-29M9] [hereinafter Lessons from
1996 Telecommunications Act] (finding that the 1996 Act incorrectly deregulated cable
television). See also Gene Kimmelman, Mark Cooper & Magda Herra, The Failure of
Competition Under the 1996 TelecommunicationsAct, 58 FED. COMm. L.J. 511 (2006).
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remerge back into just a few large firms.62 Nonetheless, with the
passage of time, the harsh assessments of the law have come to seem
overstated. Viewed as a whole, the 1996 Act did have numerous
provisions that were arguably successful: for example, telephone
companies were allowed to enter the cable industry (and did) and
cable companies to enter telephony (which they did as well). It also
created useful tools, like "forbearance" authority, which allows the
agency to hold back aspects of regulation that it sees as unnecessary,
making possible so called "light touch" regulation. 63 That authority
was used, for example, during the 2015 Net Neutrality rulemaking. 64
It cannot be denied, however, that the feature billed as the main actthe unbundling -was a bust.
There are two main explanations as to why the unbundling rules
failed. The first tends to place the blame on Congress for naively
believing that a regulatory unbundling scheme could produce
competition and blames the FCC for implementing the law in too
aggressive a manner.65 This theory also asserts that the unbundling
rules prevented "real" competitive entry, that is, entry based on
investments in new infrastructure. 66 Another camp believes that the
law was sound in principle, noting the success of similar laws in
Europe,6 7 but blames the phone companies for thwarting the law.68 For
example, the Consumers Union alleged that the Bells "refused to open
their markets by dragging their feet in allowing competitors to
interconnect, refusing to negotiate in good faith, litigating every nook
and cranny of the law, and avoiding head-to-head competition like the
plague." 69 This explanation also blames regulators for not cracking
down more severely on the Bells for their misfeasance. 70 The two
conclusions may not be inconsistent: it is certainly possible that the law
was too optimistic, that is, if you accept that the industry would be
62. THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 57, at 238-55.

63. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2012).
64. See generally Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Dkt. No. 14-28, Report
& Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) [hereinafter
Open Internet Order].
65. Introduction to THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CHALLENGE: CHANGING TECHNOLOGIES
AND EVOLVING POLICIES 16 (Charles W. Wessner ed., 2006).

66. Robert W. Crandall, Allan T. Ingraham & Hal J. Singer, Do Unbundling Policies
DiscourageCLEC Facilities-BasedInvestment, 4 BE f. OF ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 3 (2004).
67. See BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC'Y AT HARV. U., NEXT GENERATION
CONNECTIVITY: A REVIEW OF BROADBAND INTERNET TRANSITIONS AND POLICY FROM AROUND

THE WORLD 84 (2010) (describing success of unbundling regimes in other countries).
68. See, e.g., MARVIN AMMORI, Competition and Investment in Wireline Broadband, in ...
AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR ALL: A POLICY AGENDA FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION 81, 87-90

(Amit M. Schejter ed., 2009).
69. Lessonsfrom 1996 Telecommunications Act, supranote 61, at 1.
70. Id.
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determined to resist the law, and have enough litigation and lobbying
resources to do so effectively.
We may generalize the point. Competition catalysts, if successful,
will result in lost profits for the previously dominant firms and gains
by competitors or new entrants. Hence, if not particularly good
citizenship on their part, dominant firms apparently see it worthwhile
to invest in efforts to delay, defeat or nullify any efforts to spark
competition in their industry, as the Bells did with the unbundling
rules. The upshot is that, as in tax policy or criminal law, a predictable
level of investment in forms of evasion, avoidance, and legal challenge
strategies must be taken into account in the design of competition
catalysts.

71

Fifth, and a final example, serving as an important contrast to the
1996 Telecom Act is the FTC's 1977 Eyeglass Rule (otherwise known
as the Ophthalmic Practice Rules or Prescription Release Rule). 72
Optometrists had long formally or informally tied the provision of eyeexaminations with the sale of glasses. 73 The doctors either sold an eyeexamination and eye-glasses as a bundle, refused to release
prescriptions, or charged a fee for the release of the prescription to
discourage buying eyeglasses from an unaffiliated party. 7' The FTC,
in a rulemaking, required the optometrist to provide a prescription,
with which the consumer could then patronize the glasses provider of
choice, including those providing less costly alternatives.7 5 Here are
critical parts of the Eyeglass Rule, which describes itself as a
"separation" rule:
It is an unfair act or practice for an ophthalmologist or
optometrist to:
(a) Fail to provide to the patient one copy of the patient's
prescription immediately after the eye examination is
completed....

71. Cf. Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 691-95 (2003) (describing
investments in tools of legal avoidance).

72. Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and Services, 43 Fed. Reg. 23,992 (June 2, 1978)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 456).
73. Id. at 23,998.
74. Id.
75. Separation of Examination and Dispensing, 16 C.F.R. § 456.2 (2017).
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(b) Condition the availability of an eye examination to any
person on a requirement that the patient agree to purchase any
76
ophthalmic goods from the ophthalmologist or optometrist.
The rule was such a success that it has been more or less taken for
granted, and seems to have required only limited amounts of ongoing
77
enforcement, which perhaps is the best evidence of a successful rule.
Like the 1996 Act, there was a duty imposed on the industry, but one
key source of successful implementation seems to have been a simple
and standardized measure of compliance.
1.

Lessons

-

Viewing the comparative fate of these regimes provides a good
initial opportunity to discuss some of the lessons that can be drawn
from the efforts made from the 70s through 90s. The first lesson is
obvious only on reflection: that laws reducing regulatory barriers to
entry may often be more easily effective than those reducing private
barriers to entry. This follows because the regulatory barrier lies
directly within the government's control, while the private barriers
require forcing or encouraging a private company do something it
inherently does not want to (namely, face more competition).
Second, the failure of the 1996 Act's unbundling rules might be
said to confirm the idea that anticompetitive efforts, and government
generally, may do better with "thou shall nots" than "thou shalls"
78
But this
imposing prohibitions instead of affirmative duties.
conclusion may easily be taken too far. As Carterfoneand the Eyeglass
Rule suggests, it isn't true that affirmative duties designed to create
competition are inherently doomed. It is, rather, that they must be very
well designed. There needs to be a simple and standardized measure
of success, and ideally one that is in some important way "selfexecuting" -its compliance is open and obvious, and might even be
policed by consumers themselves.
Third, and finally, the success of Carterfonesuggests that the holy
grail-rarely achieved-is not always sparking competition in the
targeted industry, but promoting the growth of entirely new industries

76. Id.
77. The FTC did send out 38 warning letters in 2016, suggesting some industry
resistance. FTC Issues Warning Letters RegardingAgency's Eyeglass Rule, FTC (May 13, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/05/ftc-issues-warning-lettersregarding-agencys-eyeglass-rule [https://perma.cc/MM3U-J7DGI.
78. Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in
Communications, 5

J. ON

TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 43 (2006).
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that are in their infancy or undreamed of at the time of regulation. That
is, of course, easier said than done, but may in the long run be more
important than introducing price competition in a targeted industry.

II.

THEORY

& TAXONOMY

Having considered a few of the earlier efforts in this area, we
might take a step back, and try to describe the mechanism by which
pro-competitive laws operate. Whatever their particular form, the
catalysts of competition can be understood to come back to one simple
mechanism: reducing the costs of being a competitor.
In their classic 1983 paper, "Raising Rivals Costs," Steven Salop
and David T. Scheffman observed that among the easiest ways for a
dominant firm to reduce competition is to raise the costs of its rivals,
or competitors, using any means necessary.7 9 Competition catalysts
can be understood as following the inverse of the same logic:
increasing competition by reducing the costs faced by would-be
competitors.
Here are some of the original examples of costs that Salop and
Scheffman thought a firm might profitably try to raise for its rivals:
A variety of exclusionary practices can be characterized as
conduct that raises rivals' costs.... Inducing suppliers to
discriminate against rivals is a less extreme variant of the same
conduct. Similarly, according to Oliver Williamson's analysis of
the Pennington case, an industry-wide wage contract raised the
costs of the labor intensive competitive fringe more than it
raised the costs of the more capital-intensive dominant firms.
If there are scale economies or other entry barriers in retailing,
exclusive dealing arrangements can raise small rivals' costs of
distribution. As emphasized in the rent-seeking literature,
product standards and other government regulations can raise
rivals' relative compliance costs. Advertising expenditures and
R & D races can also be used to raise rivals' costs. For example,
suppose that increased advertising expenditures initiated by the
most efficient advertiser must be matched in effective intensity
by less efficient rivals. Advertising strategy might be profitable
even absent the demand increasing effect of the advertising.
Disadvantaging competitors can provide a benefit that exceeds
79. Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267,
267 (1983).
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its costs, if the strategy allows the dominant firm to increase
price or market share.80
As the paper suggests, in any market there are various costs of
either being a competitor or of bringing a product to market. (The
phrase "barrier to entry" usually refers to the latter cost). Among
others, it may be necessary to encourage consumers to endure the costs
of switching from one firm to another, to license intellectual property,
to gain access to wholesale distribution or retail space, or to advertise
sufficiently to gain consumer attention. The higher these costs of
competition, all else being equal, the less contested the market will be,
and vice versa. A competition catalyst is, therefore, simply any
regulation or modality which reduces a given cost of competing in a
given market for one or more competitors.
If we allow that a competition catalyst or pro-competitive law be
defined by reducing a cost of competition, it follows that we can
understand or taxonomize the major types by which cost they reduce.
The taxonomy is also a reaction to the fact that much of the current
language used in this area is extremely confusing. This probably stems
from the fact that, owing to the history of the regulated industries law,
there exists a false association with the idea of government action and
of the hindrance or blocking of competition. This misconception has
led to confusions when, for example, the phrase "deregulation" is used
81
to refer to the enactment of more, albeit pro-competitive, regulations.
What is most needed is a better vocabulary for talking about procompetitive laws and regulation. What follows is an initial effort that
is not necessarily comprehensive, but may be useful in understanding
the taxonomy. It works by categorizing pro-competitive laws based on
the "target" of the rule, that is, the barrier to competition that the law
seeks to deal with.
Table 1: A Taxonomy of Competition Catalysts
Nickname

Target

Examples

Separation Rules
Deregulation
Switching Cost Reducers
Price-Transparency Rules
Equalizers
Patent Reducers

Industry Tie-ins
Regulatory Barriers
Switching Costs
Lack of Information
Integration, Scale
Patents

Carterfone, Eyeglasses
Airline Deregulation
Number Portability
Airline Prices
Common Carriage, NN, Beer
82
FRANDs, Hatch-Waxman

80. Id. at 267-68.
81. Kearney & Merrill, supranote 12, at 1324-25.
82. The patent reducers are not considered at length in this paper.
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SeparationRules (Quarantinesor Tie-breakers)

It is not unusual for an industry or firm with power in one
product market to try to control or dominate adjacent markets. 83 In
antitrust language, one means of trying to do so is called the "tying
arrangement,"84 which is part of a broad category of efforts to use
power in one market to gain it in another known as "monopoly
leveraging." 85 A tying arrangement exists when a firm, one way or
another, forces the customer who wants product A to also buy product
B. The tying arrangement is a very close relative to the "integrated
product" and "the bundle" - the common point being that one way or
another, two or more products are combined in some way and sold as
one, often to the detriment of competitors in one of the markets.8 6
Separation rules or "tie-breakers" are efforts to encourage
competition by preventing firms from forcing or pressuring
consumers from taking two or more products instead of one. Whether
in the face of a long-term sustained monopoly, or an industry-wide
practice,8 7 the rule promotes competition in adjacent or attached
markets by "breaking" the tie, or separating the markets.8 8 When done
right, as we shall see, the separation rule can be a very effective and
important spur to competition.
1.

Successful and Failed Separation Rules

The grand success of the Carterfone and Eyeglass Rule, described
earlier, led the FCC, FTC, and other agencies to other efforts to
duplicate the approach, with varied levels of success. For example, the
contact lens industry is governed by FTC regulations similar to the

83. See, e.g., Annabelle Gawer & Michael A. Cusumano, How Companies Become Platform
Leaders, 49 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REv. 28, 30-31 (2008) (describing how dominant companies,
such as Google and Qualcomm, have used their single market dominance to expand into
alternate markets).

84. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) ("For our purposes a tying
arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product. . . .").

85. See Robin C. Feldman, Defensive Leveragingin Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079,2079 (1999)
(defines leveraging as "when a monopolist uses power in one market to induce or foreclose

sales in another market and thereby monopolize both").
86. As antitrust lawyers define a "bundle," the consumer has the option of buying the
constituent products separately and if the product is considered integrated, then, technically,
there is no tie between the two products. See David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do
Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implicationsfor Tying Law, 22 YALE
J. ON REG. 37 (2005); Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,39 (1984) (CYConner,
J. concurring) (describing the necessity of two products for an actionable tying claim).
87. Cf C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013)
(proposing the recognition of parallel exclusion as a form of monopolization).
88. See supra Section 11.1.
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Eyeglass Rule, albeit provided by statute. 89 Eye doctors are, as with the
Eyeglass Rule, required to give the consumer a prescription after an
examination without extra charge, with which the customer can use to
shop around for the best deal.9 0 The Contact Lens Rule can be
described as a qualified success - while not a failure, they have,
overall, been less effective in promoting competition for a number of
reasons.9 1 For one thing, the law was unable to mandate a prescription
system with the same simplicity as the Eyeglass Rule. Ostensibly for
reasons of consumer protection, the law tolerates the writing of
prescriptions that expire every year (requiring, of course, another trip
to the eye-doctor) and are brand specific. 92 Second, the optometrists,
for whatever reasons, have a greater tendency to resist and violate the
Contact Lens Rules by not issuing prescriptions or falsely denying
requests to verify prescriptions. 93 In 2016, in recognition of these
problems, the FTC proposed new rules that aimed at tougher
enforcement of the existing rules. 94 As this suggests, even relatively
simple separation schemes may require at least some level of public
oversight.
Meanwhile, the FCC has also tried more than once to replicate its
winning Carterfoneapproach for cable set-top boxes. The goal has been
to break the tying arrangement between the cable operator's lines and
the converter boxes that are usually found on top of a television set
(the "set-top box"). By requiring that consumers use the boxes
provided by the cable company, the industry earns an estimated $7
billion per year, making it a good case for a separation rule. 9 5
Unfortunately, the first generation of those rules serves as a caricature
of a failed separation regime.

89. See Fairness to Contact Lens Consumers, 15 U.S.C.
Lens Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 315 (2017).
90. Fairness to Contact Lens Consumers

§§

7601-7610 (2012); Contact

§ 7601.

91. See Christopher Versace, The FTC Finally Sees The Light On Contact Lenses,
FORBES (Jan. 17, 2017, 3:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisversace/2017/01/17/the[https://perma.cc/7HP2-4YQBI
ftc-finally-sees-the-light-on-contact-lenses/#75c347516dde
(arguing the rule has been less than effective with the FTC suing businesses like 1-800
Contacts and effectively protecting brick and mortar retailers from competition).

92. 16 C.F.R. §§ 315.2-315.6.
93. FTC Issues Warning Letters Regarding the Agency's Contact Lens Rule, FTC (Apr. 7,
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/04/ftc-issues-warning-lettersregarding-agencys-contact-lens-rule [https://perma.cc/D22D-SL8P].
94. Contact Lens Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,526 (proposed Dec. 7, 2016) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 315).
95. Ex Parte from TiVo Inc., Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market
for the Delivery of Video Programming,CS Docket No. 97-80, PP Docket No. 00-67, MB Docket
Nos.12-328, 14-16, & 14-42, CSR-8740-Z, CSR-8876-Z, 1 (Mar. 27, 2014), available at
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7521095660.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VQ5-L2PU] [hereinafter TiVo
Ex Parte].
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The 1996 Telecommunications Act mandated that the FCC
develop a regime to separate the set-top box from cable service. 96 The
rule instructed the FCC to "adopt regulations to assure the commercial
availability ...
of converter boxes, interactive communications
equipment, and other equipment used by consumers to access ...
[cable television]." 9 7 Working with industry, moving slowly, the FCC
in 2003 promulgated the "CableCARD" regime.9 8
The CableCARD was, and is, a specialized physical card that a
consumer requests from the cable company and plugs into a device
which then functions as a competing set-top box.99 For example, TiVo
sells a competing set-top box with special functionality. 100 The
customer pays a monthly fee for the service of around $14.99.101 The
card is sent in the mail or obtained through a visit to the operator's
office. 102
Unfortunately, the rule failed to introduce notable competition
into the set-top box market. As with the unbundling rules, the cable
industry's foot-dragging, litigation, law-breaking, and outright
sabotage did not exactly help matters. 103 By 2009, the FCC admitted
that the regime had failed (or more precisely, it admitted that "The
Commission's CableCARD rules have resulted in limited success in
developing a retail market for navigation devices."). 10 4 Unlike the
phone jack or an eyeglass prescription, it seems that most consumers
have no idea what the CableCARD is, let alone know how to ask for

96. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 304; see Competitive Availability of
Navigation Devices, 47 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2012).
97. 47 U.S.C. § 549(a).
98. Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices and Compatibility Between Cable
Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,734 (Nov. 28, 2003) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 15 & 76).
99. Digital Cable Compatibility: CableCARD-Ready Devices, FCC, https://www.fcc
.gov/reports-research/guides/digital-cable-compatibility-cablecard-ready-devices
[https://
perma.cc/Z2VU-2YB3] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
100. User

Experience,

TIVo,

https://business.tivo.com/products-solutions/ux.html

[https://perma.cc/L2UC-39ZJ] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
101. Service Plans, TIVO, https://www.tivo.com/buytivo/popups/popup-servicePlans
.html [https://perma.cc/YV4G-TJQL) (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
102. See CableCARD: Know Your Rights, FCC (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/
media/cablecard-know-your-rights [https://perma.cc/G3WT-KT5W]. See also FAQs: About
CableCARDTm Decoders, TIVO, https://www.tivo.com/buytivo/faqs/about

cablecarddecoders

[https://perma.cc/X45W-2UN6] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
103. See Harold Feld, My Insanely Long Field Guide to the War on CableCARD - PartI: More
Background Than You
Can Possibly Imagine, WETMACHINE (Oct. 19, 2014),
http://www.wetmachine.com/tales-of-the-sausage-factory/my-insanely-long-field-guide-tothe-war-on-cablecard-part-i-more-background-than-you-can-possibly-imagine/

[https://perma.cc/6VEL-APGfl; TiVo Ex Parte, supra note 95.
104. Comment Sought on Video Device Innovation, GN Dkt. Nos. 09-47, 09-51, 09-137, CS
Dkt. No. 97-80, Public Notice, 24 FCC Rcd. 14,280, 4 (2009), available at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-09-2519A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/477SXK4R].
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one; and only a few vendors tried to make use of the rule. 0 5 The fact
that it must be known about, requested, and paid for (through a
monthly fee) -and that its provisioning is within the control of the
industry who may simply refuse to provide the card, or otherwise
make it hard to get-make it not at all surprising that the regime
failed. 106 The clearest measure of the CableCARD's failure is the fact
that the market for set-top boxes remains at some $20 billion per year,
with cable companies controlling over 99% of the market in every
jurisdiction. 10 7 And the FCC's 2016 effort to improve on CableCARD
with a new rule was successfully blocked by the cable industry and its
allies. 108

2.

The Importance of Clean Cuts

With these examples in hand, we can continue our discussion of
when separation rules succeed or fail. First, as the adage goes "when
butchering, you need to cut at the joint, not at the bones." The tiebreakers that have been most successful make a cut between two
things that are identifiably or obviously separate products and
services, whether by tradition, or based on the physical properties of
the products or services involved. We can see that the Eyeglass Rule,
by making the cut between the service (examination) and the product
(the glasses), came away with cleanly divided markets, and the same
can be said of the Contact Lenses Rule.

105. See Nate Anderson, FCC Admits CableCARD a Failure, Vows to Try Something Else,
ARs TECHNICA (Dec. 4, 2009, 10:38 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/12/fccadmits-cablecard-a-failure-vows-to-try-something-else [https://perma.cc/LEU8-V4CP].
106. See id.; see also Shiva Stella, Findingfrom Senators Markey, Blumenthal Highlight Need
for Cable Box Reform, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (July 30, 2015), https://www.public
knowledge.org/press-release/findings-from-senators-markey-blumenthal-highlight-needfor-cable-box-refor [https://perma.cc/JJ6A-ZSPRI.
107. See Expanding Consumer's Video Navigation Choices and Commercial Availability of
Navigation Devices, MB Dkt. No. 16-42, CS Dkt. No. 97-80, Report & Order, 31 FCC Rcd. 1544,
(2016) (Statement of Commissioner Mignon L. Clyburn), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-16-18A3.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC4P-A6MF].
108. Jon Brodkin, FCC Chairman Pai Takes Wheeler's Set-Top Box Plan off the Table, ARS
TECHNICA (Jan. 30, 2017, 3:08 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/
2017/01/fcc-chairman-pai-takes-wheelers-set-top-box-plan-off-the-table/
[https://perma.cc/UD69-QQMX].
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Figure 1: Clean vs. Unclean Cut
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In contrast, the 1996 Telecom Act's unbundling rules, in most of
their variations, created an unclean cut. The product created was a
prescribed mixture of the incumbent carrier's product and the
competitor's product. 109 The creation necessarily left the incumbent
with power over its competitor's product delivery, a position that they
repeatedly exploited. 110 The CableCARD regime, similarly, produced
a regime where the consumer needed to deal with the incumbent in
order to gain access to a competing product.
The cleanness of the cut is not the only issue, for as we've
discussed before, industry resistance makes an enormous difference.
The Bell companies engaged in exceptional, outlandish, and illegal
resistance to the mandates of the 1996 Act, and the cable companies
were nearly as resolute in their resistance to the CableCARD.11 1 This
isn't to say that regulators should surrender to industry resistance. But
it does mean, as stated above, that separation rules must take into
account the incentive and the ability of the incumbent to sabotage,
delay, or otherwise make the scheme ineffective.
How effective lawbreaking will be also depends on the design of
the regime. At the risk of belaboring the point, a key difference
between the (successful) phone jack and the (failed) CableCARD
regimes is that the phone jack allowed the competing phone
manufacturer and the consumer to have a direct, non-intermediated
relationship. The CableCARD left the cable company with an
intermediary role, which, predictably, stunted the relationship. It was

109. To be sure, such mixed products have been successful in other contexts-consider
Spotify or Netflix's Red envelopes-but in those cases there were existing horizontal

divisions inherent in the design of the mail system of Internet.
110. See generally THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 57, at ch. 18.
111. See Lessons from 1996 TelecommunicationsAct, supra note 61; Feld, supranote 103.

COLO. TECH. L.

54

|Vol. 16.1

as if, following a divorce proceeding, the former spouse remained in
the house.
Second, it is worth returning to the question of what is demanded
of consumers. The prescription script generated by the Eyeglass Rule
was easy to understand and use. The standardized telephone jack left
the consumer with nothing to do but buy a telephone and plug it in. In
contrast, other rules like the cable set-top-box rule and the mobilephone handset rules have required some set of complex unlocking
procedures that typically depend on calling an incumbent to help out,
which it has limited interest in doing. When a pro-competitive scheme
depends on affirmative action by the incumbent for its success, one
may predict less success.
The rule of thumb, therefore is this: an effective separation rule,
and the standard involved, must eliminate, to the extent possible, any
active role played by the incumbent in the relationship between the
consumer and a would-be consumer.
B.

Deregulation:Pro-competitive Removal of Regulatory Barriers

Some of the most effective pro-competitive laws work by
eliminating or reducing regulatory barriers to entry. The word
"deregulation" is usually used in this context, though sometimes in
very confusing ways. It is important to distinguish between procompetitive deregulation-which is targeted specifically at catalyzing
competition-and deregulation generally. Weakening or eliminating
public protections and consumer protection measures may be
deregulatory, but not necessarily in the pro-competitive manner meant
here. For example, reducing emissions requirements for automakers
would save the industry money, but not make it more competitive in
any obvious way.
The classic example of pro-competitive deregulation was, as
we've already seen, the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act, which
eliminated existing constraints imposed by the Civil Aeronautics
Board on market entry and exit.1 12 A more recent example is the FDA's
2016 effort to open the market in hearing aids. 113 Hearing aids have
long required an examination and fitting process, and the aids are

112. Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504,92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
113. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Steps to Improve Hearing Aid
Accessibility (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnounce
ments/ucm532005.htm [https://perma.ccfLBN5-HY72].
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usually sold in a bundle with the examination. 114 The market is
occupied by an oligopoly of providers, and the prices are high, as
compared to the costs of other electronics.1 15 According to PCAST, a
2014 survey found that the average price of one hearing aid was $2,363,
with premium models costing $2,898; given that most people require
two hearing aids, the prices are in the $4,700-$5,600 range. 116 Despite
rapid decreases in the prices of comparable electronic devices, there
has been little price reduction or innovation in hearing aids.1 17 The
high price, apparently, has discouraged usage of hearing aids; PCAST
estimates that only 15-30% of people who need hearing aids actually
get them.1 18
In December 2016, pursuant to the Competitive Initiative, the
FDA announced that "it does not intend to enforce the requirement
that individuals 18 and up receive a medical evaluation or sign a
waiver prior to purchasing most hearing aids," and that the FDA had
committed to "consider creating a category of over-the-counter (OTC)
hearing aids that could deliver new, innovative, and lower-cost
products to millions of consumers." 119 The rulemakings are not yet
complete, but the pro-competitive, deregulatory logic intrinsic to the
effort should be obvious.
Some pro-competitive deregulation seeks not to eliminate but
lessen the burden on competitors. The Hatch-Waxman Act, discussed
above, did not eliminate the FDA, but did make it easier for generics
to get drugs to market, through the abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA). 120 It carefully limited, without eliminating, the FDA's power
to slow market entry.
The greatest concern surrounding pro-competitive deregulation
must be that which accompanies any deregulatory action. It is the
weakening of the protections for the public that (hopefully) motivated
regulation in the first place, whether concerns of public safety,
consumer protection, or the systemic stability of the industry or the
broader economy. The danger, in other words, is that under the banner

&

114. PRES. COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT ON AGING AMERICAN
HEARING LOSS: IMPERATIVE OF IMPROVED TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2015), http://hearing

loss.org/sites/default/files/docs/PCASTHearingTechLetterReportFINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EWL4-9TA3].
115. Id. at 2.
116. Id. at 1.
117. Id. at 2.
118. Id. at 1.
119. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 113.
120. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
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of "increased competition" regulators may be persuaded to weaken
important protections. 121
There are also potentially unforeseeable dangers from
deregulating part, but not all, of an industry. Here, the well-known
partial deregulation of the California energy market provides one
example of the dangers of a purportedly pro-competitive regime. 122 In
that case, hoping to increase competition in the generation of
electricity, the State forced the divestiture of some 20% of generating
capacity, deregulated wholesale pricing, while retaining a
monopolized retail delivery and pricing.1 23 The setup was quickly
abused by opportunistic wholesalers, especially Enron, who created
artificial shortages to drive wholesale pricing through the roof. 124 The
consequence was the near-collapse of the California energy utility,
PG&E, enormous public costs, and a lesson in the dangers of partial
deregulation. 125
The California deregulation scheme was an exceptionally bad
design, but it should not be taken as dictating that it is impossible to
have deregulation of the anti-competitive aspects of a regime without
destroying other public protections. For example, the Hatch-Waxman
Act, while promoting competition, has not resulted in the collapse of
the prescription drug system, nor has it led to an abandoned public
safety regime. The latter point is important: for there was no
assumption by the drafters of Hatch-Waxman that competition would
somehow, magically, take care of public safety issues.
The lesson that might be taken from this area is this: that procompetitive deregulation can be extremely effective in introducing
competition, but that competition goals should be seen as separate
from public safety or consumer protection concerns. Indeed, the
introduction of lower-cost competitors may sometimes require
expanded protections for the public.
C.

Switching Cost Reducers

Switching costs are a barrier to competition because they require
that a competitor not just be slightly better, but quite a bit better to
121. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009).

122. The Electric Utility Industry Restructuring Act, CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330 (1996).
123. Id.
124. See Hearingson Examining Enron:Electricity Manipulationand the Effect on the Western
States Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the S. Comm.
on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 107th Cong (2002).
125. See generally PAUL W. MACAvoY,
DEREGULATION, ch. 4 (2007).
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compensate for the costs incurred in changing providers. (Hence,
Geico's injunction to switch insurance providers: "15 minutes could
save you 15% or more"). 126 This is particularly the case for businesses
where the customer has a long-term, dependent relationship, such as
one might have with an accountant, family physician, or an airline. A
sense of the importance of switching costs can be understood by
thinking of the difference between switching one's cable company and
deciding to patronize a new restaurant.
Companies are well aware of the importance of switching costs.
New entrants or companies in the competitive fringe often undertake
promotions that try to lower the costs of switching in various ways.
Meanwhile, those with large customer bases usually try to increase
switching costs in ways subtle or less so. Many companies make it
difficult to quit, or ensure that it will take considerable time and effort
to return to previous levels of comfort. They may require multiple
steps to cancel an account, including a phone call, a personal visit to
the local office, or similar measures. The loss of something importantlike a well-known phone number or a list of contacts-may also
discourage switching, as do long-term loyalty programs, like the
frequent flier programs of airlines.
Pro-competitive regulation in this area usually consists of trying
to isolate the source of switching costs and then reduce them through
regulation. Arguably the most successful effort in this area has been
the "number portability" rules adopted by the FCC for the mobile
phone market. 127 Boiled down, the rules require that consumers be
allowed to "bring along" their numbers when they change service
providers-so that a number, say 202-421-5445 may follow you as you
switch from Verizon to AT&T to T-Mobile and so on. The premise is
that losing one's number represents a switching cost that the
regulation eliminates. Portability is broadly relied on by consumers;
and the estimated savings to consumers in terms of lower prices
offered by the lower-cost "mavericks" T-Mobile and Sprint have been
estimated in the billions. 128 Meanwhile, while hard to measure, some
of the significance of the portability rules may lie in promoting the

126. GEICO could save you money, GEICO, https://www.geico.com/save/money/
[https://perma.cc/QN8K-NSX6] (last visited July 10, 2017).
127. 47 C.F.R. § 52.20 (1996).
128. New Report Finds Efficient Number PortabilitySaved U.S. Consumers Billions ofDollars,
NEUSTAR (Mar. 8, 2013), https://www.neustar.biz/about-us/news-room/press-releases/2013/
report-finds-efficient-number-portability-saved-us-consumers-billions
[http://perma.cc/D8
ZU-EJQ2].
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growth of wireless telephony, as a whole, as a competitor to wireline
telephony.
The tool of reducing switching costs through regulation or
encouraging best-practices is not, at present, widely used, outside of
the telephone context. However, it may be of increasing importance in
an era where people store large parts of their personal information
(email correspondence, photos, lists of friends) online. 129 Consider, for
example, if you wanted to stop using Google, Gmail, and associated
companies for whatever reason. How difficult would it be to access
and "port" to all of your photos, emails, and so on? If you wanted to
quit Facebook for a competitor, can you bring along your network of
friends? As it stands, data portability is the subject of only voluntary
regimes which are sometimes quite limited in their scope. Given the
financial importance of the major platforms and relative dearth of
competition, it is not impossible to imagine data portability rules,
modeled on number portability rules, specifically designed to reduce
switching costs.
D.

Leveling the PlayingField / Common CarrierRegulation

The advantages of economies of scale, vertical integration, and
control over distribution or retail channels have obvious implications
for competition in nearly every industry. Regulatory "equalizers," or
facility rules, are rules that mandate anti-discrimination and create a
level playing field for those who depend on the facility.
The antidiscrimination aspects of the old common carrier rules
adopted for a variety of transportation technologies, from freight
trains through canals, can be understood as the ancestor to facility
rules. Common carrier rules have the purpose and effect of requiring
the carrier to treat all customers equally and transparently -whether
at the consumer level, or at the producer level. 130
Consider two competing oil refineries S and C, who need to reach
their retailers by train. In the absence of common carrier rules, S can
cut a deal with the railroad to carry his freight for less and C's for more,
thereby raising C's costs of competition, even if C has a better or
cheaper product. As antitrust aficionados will recognize, this was one
129. Alexander MacGillivray & Jay Shambaugh, Exploring Data Portability,WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (Sept. 30, 2016, 1127 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/09/30/exploringdata-portability [https://perma.cc/U6JH-53AH].
130. See ICC v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 275 (1892) ("[T]he principles of the common
law applicable to common carriers .. . demand[s] little more than that they should carry for
all persons who applied, in the order in which the goods were delivered at the particular
station, and that their charges for transportation should be reasonable.").
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of the strategies undertaken by Standard Oil to maintain its monopoly
over oil refining. 131 Under a common carriage regime, where the trains
are required to carry freight at the same rates for all customers, S and
C's competition depends more on the relative merits of their products.
The most obvious modem manifestation of such rules are the Net
Neutrality rules first proposed in the early 21st century for Internet
carriage. 132 The basic idea behind the Net Neutrality rules was to
require the main Internet carriers not to discriminate as between the
senders of information over the Internet, and not accept payment for
faster carriage. 133 As such, among the goals of the Net Neutrality rules
has been to promote competition on the merits, and a Darwinian
innovation policy. 134
Another historic example of an effort to level a playing field is the
state and federal rules governing competition in the alcohol industry.
Both the federal government and most states have rules that seek to

protect the economic independence of producers, retailers, and
distributors of alcoholic beverages. 135 As such, the rules largely
prevent any one company from using its power at one vertical level of

the economy to influence competition in other layers-so that, for
example, InterBev, the dominant beer brewer, may not bribe retailers
to ensure carriage of only their brands, at the expense of smaller
competitors (like craft beer). 136

At their best, these kinds of rules can promote the kind of
Schumpeterian innovation described earlier, by creating a platform

from which new firms or indeed entirely new industries might get
started. The Net Neutrality policies and rules, which protected the
Internet as an innovation platform, are arguably the most successful of

such rules over the early 21st century.
E.

Truth-in-PricingRules

Price transparency rules are different than some of the others

discussed in this paper, because they do not necessarily reduce the
costs of competition; rather, they try to prevent distortions in the

131. See ELIOT

JONES,

THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 72-77 (1921).

132. See original proposal in Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination,2 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003).

133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (2012). An overview of
some of the laws can be found in Roni Elias, Three Cheers for Three Tiers: Why the Three-Tier
System MaintainsIts Legal Validity and Social Benefits After Granholm, 14 DEPAUL BUS. & COM.
L.J. 209 (2015).
136. Federal Alcohol Administration Act, §§ 201-205.
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competitive process created by drip pricing, hidden fees, or other
forms of deceptive pricing. 137
The most straightforward truth-in-pricing rules require "all-in"
pricing, that is, the advertising or display of any fees that are
mandatory, or effectively so, and therefore part of the price. Other
price transparency rules require the disclosure of important optional
fees, like baggage fees for airlines. 138
The National Economic Council has described a variety of
reasons, related to competition, that pricing schemes may be of
concern. They include:
Deceptive pricing may also inhibit the competitive process.
Specifically, it may hurt the ability of a price-cutting competitor
to take business away from a more expensive rival. The creation
of consumer confusion and wariness around actual prices may
make consumers disbelieve advertised prices, making it harder
for the genuine price-cutter to attract consumers. Moreover, the
higher-priced rival may use hidden fees to effectively shroud its
comparatively higher prices. This may reduce real price
competition.
Fourth, unusual pricing practices may facilitate "follow-theleader" pricing among competitors. The setting of "standard"
add-on fees, which are in theory not part of the negotiated price,
provides an ideal anchor for tacit coordination because they are
typically set at the national level and fluctuate less frequently
than the base prices themselves. As a result, for example, such
fees make it easier for the airline industry to implement and
sustain prices without an explicit agreement. In this example,
the major airlines would likely find it easier to implement and
sustain a 'standard' change fee of $250 as it may be easier to
139
coordinate on that price than the prices for travel itself.
The Department of Transportation, for example, has imposed
such rules on the airline industry, requiring that they list charges like
gasoline surcharges and taxes in the price presented to consumers on
their website and on search engines. 140 A Department of

137. Charlie Anderson, Follow the Fees, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 28, 2016, 2:31 PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/12/28/follow-fees [https://perma.cc/M24W-XLQK].
138. Guidance on Disclosure of Policies and Charges Associate with Checked Baggage,
73 Fed. Reg. 28,854 (May 19, 2008).
139. NATL ECON. COUNCIL, THE COMPETITION INITIATIVE AND HIDDEN FEES (2016).

140. 49 Fed. Reg. 49,330 (Dec. 20, 1984) (now codified as amended at 14 C.F.R. §299.84(a)).
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Transportation proposed rulemaking would also require that baggage
fees and change fees be disclosed. 1 41
III.

POTENTIAL AND PERILS

There is much potential, but also possible perils in any usage of
rules to pursue the goals of antitrust. The potential, not necessary to
repeat at length, lies in opening markets long-closed to effective
competition, and the consequent gains for consumers and the
economy. It also lies in the promotion of competition using a tool other
than litigation-driven, ex post antitrust investigations, which have
inherent limitations.
Yet, if the track-record of the last several decades suggests
anything, it is that not all such schemes succeed. This paper has
attempted to develop some rules-of-thumb that might help future lawmakers or regulators design pro-competitive rules that succeed. They
are, to summarize:
(1) Government elimination of public regulatory barriers is a
more direct remedy than efforts to eliminate private
barriers-regimes that require affirmative action by an
incumbent are more challenging;
(2) If the goal is opening a market through a separation rule, a
clean cut that yields a real market is desirable;
(3) If possible, the incumbent must be reduced to a passive role,
at best, in the relationship between consumer and competitor;
(4) Standards should be simple, and ideally passive in the
manner just described; and
(5) Removing regulatory barriers to entry does not necessitate
removing public protections; indeed, protections may need to
be stronger.
In closing, there are several further dangers that ought to also be
considered:
First, a poorly designed regime may both fail to create any
additional competition and worse, serve to insulate the industry from
antitrust scrutiny. Cases like Trinko or Credit-Suisse, which demand

141. Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Obama AdministrationAnnounces New Actions
to Spur Competition in the Airline Industry, Give Consumers the Information They Need to Make
Informed Choices, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/10/18/fact-sheet-obama-administration-announces-new-actions-spurcompetition [https://perma.cc/8NTZ-2SAM].
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deference to comprehensive regulatory schemes, create the danger of
nullifying antitrust oversight. 1 4 2 Even if technically, the industry
remains subject to the antitrust laws (through, for example, a savings
clause), the mere existence of the regime may make competition
agencies hesitant to act. When it comes to cable set-top boxes, for
example, the badly designed CableCARD regime has done little to
spark competition or save consumers money. However, it does seem
to have been effective at keeping antitrust enforcers at bay.
Second, a poorly designed regime, or a market that, in fact, does
not support a large number of competitors, may simply add a
regulatory burden, without much benefit for consumers, competitors,
or anyone at all.
Third, the cause of using laws to ensure "competition" can be
used as an excuse to erode consumer protection or other public
measures that really have nothing to do with the conditions of
competition. Given a public issue-say, the dangers of a product or
service -it does not necessarily follow that a competitive market will
be any more inclined to address the issue on its own. Indeed, the
industry may be less inclined due to the pressures of competition. In
this sense, it may sometimes be important to increase consumer
protections when increasing competition - the story of the airline
industry makes this point particularly clear.
Finally, it is a simple truth that any regulatory system, even an
avowedly pro-competitive law, can be used to forestall, entrench, and
otherwise damage competition. This is a challenge to which there is no
simple solution, other than ongoing vigilance.
These warnings and rules of thumb are not intended to dissuade
lawmakers or regulators from using rules to promote competition. As
the greatest successes show, there lies enormous potential in using the
power of rulemaking to promote the goals of the antitrust statutes, and
the best and most successful rules have transformed industries for the
better.
CONCLUSION

Decades of experience have suggested that both adjudications
and rules have their merits and disadvantages. The specific history of
the antitrust laws, and their relative age, has given adjudication (or
142. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 540 U.S. 398 (2004);
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); see Hearings on Life After Trinko and
Credit Suisse: The Role of Antitrust in Regulated Industries Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Competition Policy of the H.R Comm. on the Judiciary, 11th Cong. (2010).
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litigation) a central role in creating antitrust policy. Nonetheless, as the
more successful examples illustrated here suggested, it is well worth
asking whether the goals of antitrust policy might be well achieved
using industry-specific rules, whether promulgated by the antitrust
agencies themselves, or other agencies.

